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Abortion bans are back in Vogue! Nearly 165 years after the first massive
demonstration on women’s rights, discussions on the extent to which interference
with female bodies falls within States’ margin of appreciation (‘MoA’) remain
apropos. Indeed, the recent Polish near-absolute abortion ban has revived the
debate on the existence of a foetus’ right to life and balancing it with women’s right to
abortion.
Against this background, the present post sheds light on the status of the ‘right to
abortion’ in international law. To this end, it explores the status of this putative right
through the lenses of the relevant jurisprudence of the European Court of Human
Rights (‘ECtHR’) and other regional bodies as well as of the customary interpretative
tools enshrined in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (‘VCLT’).
A Foetus’ “Right to Life” v. A Woman’s “Right to Abortion”
The ECtHR Grand Chamber most explicitly stated its position on the foetus’ right
to life in its famous Vo v. France judgment. Precisely, it highlighted that the unborn
is not regarded as a “person” directly protected under the European Convention on
Human Rights (‘ECHR’) Article 2 and that ‘if the unborn do have a “right” to “life”, it is
implicitly limited by the mother’s rights and interests’ (para 80). It further noted that
the ECHR institutions have not ‘ruled out the possibility that in certain circumstances
safeguards may be extended to the unborn child’ (Vo v. France, para 80). In this
passage, the Court seems to have distinguished between the right to life on one
hand and safeguards that may, under certain circumstances, be extended to the
unborn on the other; the ECtHR does not regard the unborn as a holder of the right
to life but rather as a beneficiary of some safeguards under certain circumstances.
On the existence of a right to abortion, the Court underlined – just as the
Commission already had (Brüggemann and Scheuten v. Germany, para 61) – that,
although legislation regulating the interruption of pregnancy touches upon the sphere
of private life, protected by ECHR Article 8(1), the norm ‘cannot be interpreted as
meaning that pregnancy and its termination are, as a principle, solely a matter
of the private life of the mother’ (Vo v. France, para 80). Instead, ‘the issue’ is
‘determined by weighing up various, and sometimes conflicting, rights or freedoms
claimed by a woman, a mother or a father in relation to one another or vis-à-vis
an unborn child.’ (Vo v. France, para 80). The Court has clarified that when the
pregnant woman’s life is risked, access to abortion is non-negotiable (X v. the United
Kingdom, para 19).
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In 2010, it further acknowledged a consensus amongst the substantial majority of
ECHR States-parties towards allowing abortion on broader grounds than the risk to
the pregnant woman’s health (A, B and C v. Ireland, para 235). However, it found
that the MoA enjoyed by the States on the regulation of abortions remained broad
and that allowing abortions only when the health of the mother is at stake, did not
exceed this MoA (A, B and C v. Ireland, para 241). To reach this conclusion, the
Court relied on applicants’ discretion to travel to other ECHR States-parties for the
requested abortion.
Overview of ECHR Member-States’ Current Approach
Eleven years later, out of the 47 ECHR States-parties, 40 do not only acknowledge
the legality of abortion on broader grounds, but have further legalised abortion on
demand during the first 10 to 24 weeks of the pregnancy.
Conversely, 7 ECHR Member-States maintain strict anti-abortion policies, ranging
from Malta and Andorra prohibiting abortions in all circumstances  [a deviation
from the existing case-law of ECHR-institutions on the matter (X v. the United
Kingdom, para 19)] to  San Marino and Liechtenstein, which allow abortions when
the pregnancy poses a serious danger to the woman’s life or health, or results
from rape or sexual assault. In Monaco and Hungary abortions are additionally
allowed in cases of fetal deformity, whereas in Poland – although prohibited in
case of fetal deformity – abortions are legal in cases of incest, rape, or when the
pregnancy threatens the life of the mother.
These States send an explicit message of differentiated practice among ECHR
Member States. Such practice of the ECHR does not qualify as an interpretative
tool under VCLT Article 31(3)(b) (Villiger, pp. 431-432), which envisages a uniform
subsequent state practice (or at least a convergent practice of the majority of States-
parties, to which the other States-parties assent or do not oppose). This was most
likely the basis of ECtHR’s pronouncement of a wide MoA enjoyed by the States on
the regulation of abortions.
Towards a Holistic Interpretation of the ECHR
Still, the practice described can – and should – be taken into account as a
supplementary tool of interpretation in a holistic appraisal of the ECHR [in line with
VCLT Article 32]. In fact, against the background of the principle ex injuria, jus non
oritur, according to which illegal acts do not create law and which can also serve as
an interpretative tool (Pellet, pp. 7-9), the interpretative value of unlawful absolute
anti-abortion state practices (i.e. of Malta and Andorra) decreases vis-à-vis the lawful
practice of other ECHR-parties.
Furthermore, for the interpretation of ECHR Article 8 and the identification of the
scope of the right to abortion entailed therein, inspiration may be drawn from
relevant rules of international law [VCLT Article 31(3)(c)]. In this regard, the Human
Rights Committee (‘HRCtee’) has repeatedly (Zureick, pp. 125-130) underlined that
regulations restricting a woman’s access to abortion in cases of rape or incest are
incompatible with Article 7 (freedom from torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading
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behaviour) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR”).
Similarly, the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women has
called for States to allow abortion beyond cases where pregnancy threatens a
woman’s life. Likewise, the HRCtee clarified that restrictions on access to abortion
in cases of fatal foetal abnormality violate inter alia Article 7 of the ICCPR and that
the ability of pregnant women to travel abroad in order to obtain the required abortion
did not purify such violation (Mellet v. Ireland, para. 9; Whelan v. Ireland, para. 9).
In a similar fashion, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (‘IACHR’)
has persistently urged States to safeguard women’s reproductive rights. In fact, in a
Joint Statement with human rights experts, the IACHR’s Rapporteur on the Rights
of Women called on States to legalise abortions – at the very minimum – in cases
of sexual assault, rape, incest, and where the continued pregnancy endangers a
woman’s mental and physical health.
Against this background, seeing the ECtHR acknowledge that a Member-State does
not violate its ECHR obligations simply because another ECHR Member-State steps
in and assures the protection of women’s access to abortion seems rather obscure.
However, this is the approach the Court has so far embraced (A, B and C v. Ireland,
para. 239) and maintained, despite criticism (Ghráinne and McMahon, 569).
After all, the ECtHR’s consideration of predominant moral perceptions in one State
(A, B and C v. Ireland, para. 239) does not align with a contextual and evolutive
interpretation of the ECHR. Precisely, it has been argued that, as during the drafting
of the ECHR, abortion was illegal in most States, the intention of the drafters could
not have been to grant a right to abortion, especially a right to abortion on demand.
Aside from the flawed perception of human rights as derivative rights, inherent in this
argumentation, the latter neglects the intention of the drafters to create a document
adaptable to the times (Tyrer v. the United Kingdom, para 31). In fact, protests on
the legalisation of abortion on demand  indicate a changing moral perception of
abortion, buttressed by the practice of a majority of ECHR-parties.
Against this background, it seems that it is about time that the so far unspoken right
to abortion found its way into the ECtHR’s jurisprudence!
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